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Mainstream interest based financial system marginalized many Muslims as 
the system is in conflict with the principles of sharīʿah (Islamic law). Islāmic 
banking and finance (IBF) institutions aimed at promoting Islāmic norms of 
economic behavior, and ultimately to realize the maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah have 
developed and offer sharīʿah compliant financial instruments. The growth of 
IBF institutions has been phenomenal since their introduction in the 1960s. 
The upsurge of IBF in the 1970s was driven by oil price rises, competition 
for regional power between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and a general Islāmic 
resurgence. The second upsurge has involved similar drivers, but with the 
added benefit of standardized regulation and management, as well as 
improved overall business decision-making. The aftermath of 11 September 
2001 reinforced the second surge in Islāmic finance. However, IBF 
institutions have tended to respond to prevailing forces of the international 
financial system by moving closer to conventional financial institutional 
practice. IBF is supposed to expand the Muslim financial base and reduce 
financial exclusion, but many institutions have been taken over by pragmatic 
bankers who shift the core operation away from the original religious and 
social ideals. The new generation of financial instruments are at odds with 
the foundational axioms of Islāmic economics. As such, the concept behind 
IBF has been reduced to the mere removal of ribā’ and the conduct of 
financial activities according to sharīʿah derived contractual norms. IBF 
institutions are following the letter of the sharīʿah, but not its spirit, the 
maqāṣid. The simplistic ‘pragmatism’ may mean that the globalization and 
unprecedented growth of IBF would permeate the lives of many poorer 
disenfranchised Muslims. However, more recent developments in IBF such 
as iMFI and social impact ṣukūk (Islāmic bond) suggest that IBF is moving 
to a more socially inclusive and sustainable finance.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Mainstream interest based transaction is in conflict with the principles 
of sharīʿah (Islamic law)1, marginalizing many Muslims from global 
economic and financial systems. Islāmic banking and finance (IBF) 
institutions were introduced in the 1960s to serve marginalized 
Muslims with modern financial services, through sharīʿah compatible 
instruments. The ideal of IBF is to promote Islāmic norms of economic 
behavior, and ultimately to realize the maqāṣid (objectives) of 
sharīʿah2. In economic contexts, it is to create a just economic system. 
Al-Zuhayli, states that “the primary goal of Islamic financial 
institutions is not profit-making, but the endorsement of the goals of 
socio-economic development and the alleviation of poverty” (Al-
Zuhayli, 2003).  
 The IBF institutions introduced attracted Muslims who 
shunned the mainstream interest based system. Islāmic deposits took 
off rapidly, suggesting there are unsupplied demands of Islamicly 
accepted products and services (Wilson, 2005). The industry grew at 
a phenomenal rate; over the last decade, Islāmic finance has grown 10 
percent to 12 percent. Islāmic banking exists in more than 60 
countries and the industry has become systemically important in 13 
jurisdictions3 (IMF, 2018). In 2018, Islāmic assets (banking, capital 
markets, and Takaful) reached USD2.19 trillion (IFSB, 2019), up 
from just USD150 billion in the 1990s. However, even with the 
phenomenal growth, IBF only represents a very small share of global 
financial assets, and only about 28 percent of the population in 
Muslim-majority countries use formal or semi-formal financial 
intermediaries. Furthermore, empirical studies on Muslim majority 
countries show that the proportion of Muslim population using 
financial intermediary services is less than that of their non-Muslim 
counterparts (Mohieldin, et. al., 2011; Demirguc-Kunt, Beck, and 
Honohan 2008; El-Hawary and Grais, 2005).4 
 In the early stages of development, IBF institutions were 
typically banks catering to Muslims and operating on ribā’-free basis. 
Broad changes in global political and economic environments led to 
more diverse and innovative IBF instruments, catering to both Muslim 
and non-Muslim customers. More complex financial instruments such 
as sukūk (Islāmic bond) and the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index were 
introduced and IBF institutions were increasingly integrated into the 
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global economy with involvement in mega development projects. In 
addition, global financial players such as Citibank, Standard 
Chartered, and HSBC established Islamic “windows” and Islāmic 
banking subsidiaries such as Standard Chartered Saadiq and HSBC 
Amanah. At the country level, Pakistan, Iran and Sudan turned their 
financial system to be based entirely on sharīʿah principles, while 
countries such as Malaysia have a dual system where mainstream 
interest based and the IBF system co-exist.  
 The phenomenal growth of IBF raises the questions of why 
and how the industry has managed to achieve the growth alongside 
well established mainstream financial institutions, and how the 
industry has succeeded in becoming one of the players in the global 
financial system. However, more importantly how far has IBF, as 
practiced to date, provided greater inclusion and empowerment for 
Muslims as envisioned by the maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah? This paper 
examines the factors responsible for the phenomenal growth of the 
IBF industry, and questions whether it has satisfied its ideal mission 
of inclusion and building a just economic system.  
 
2.  EVOLUTION OF IBF 
 
A few pilot experiments precede the establishment of formal IBF 
institutions. In the Indian subcontinent, loan cooperatives, influenced 
by European mutual loan experiments infused with religious and 
ethical ideals were started in the 1940s (Heikal, 1983). At least one 
short-lived experiment took place in Pakistan during the late 1950s, 
when rural landlords created an interest free credit network (Warde, 
2000).  
 Modern IBF institutions can be traced to the establishment of 
the MitGhamr Saving Bank by Dr. Ahmed al-Najjar in Egypt, and the 
Tabung Haji5 (Pilgrimage Fund) proposed by Professor Ungku Aziz 
in Malaysia in 1963. The MitGhmar experiment was influenced by 
West German mutual saving scheme with capital funded by West 
German banks. Even though MitGhamr did not pay or charge interest, 
it did not make any reference to sharīʿah in its charter; this is unlike 
Tabung Haji which specifically caters for saving of Muslims for the 
purpose of making pilgrimage to Mecca. The two experiments caught 
the eyes of Islāmic scholars who had been seeking an Islāmic 
economic model since the early 20th century. Consequently, they 
began to promote the establishment of IBF institutions in academic 
circles and political figures started to use the concept as a tool to 
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awaken the public as well as for their personal political mileage 
(Warde, 2000). In Pakistan for example, Islāmic banking is on the 
platform of every major political party, and any politician not 
endorsing it risks political suicide (Rivlin, 2008). 
 At its peak, MitGhmar had nine branches, 250,000 depositors 
and close to two million Egyptian pounds in deposits (Al-Omar and 
Abdel-Haq, 1996). The circumstances behind its closure are somewhat 
obscure. By some accounts it had encountered financial problems; 
others suggest that it was commercially successful but was politically 
forced to close because of infiltration by the Muslim brotherhood. 
With the closing of MitGhmar, in 1971, the Egyptian government 
created the Nasser Social Bank as part of its policy of co-opting 
Islāmic groups in its fight against leftist elements. The official goals 
of Nasser Social Bank were to “broaden the base of social solidarity 
among citizens” and “provide aid to needy citizens”. Similar with 
MitGhmar, there was no direct reference to Islam, but the bank 
operated based on muḍārabah and the collection and distribution of 
zakāt (Rivlin, 2008). 
Further East, Royal Professor Ungku Abdul Aziz who saw the 
need for Muslims to gradually accumulate savings before performing 
the Haj submitted to the government the proposal “A Plan to Improve 
the Economic Position of Future Pilgrims” in 1959. He recommended 
that future pilgrims should save in a financial institution untainted by 
ribā’ but yielding profits. The concept paper on the organization and 
activities of Tabung Haji was presented to Sheikh Mahmoud Al-
Shahltut, Rector of Al-Azhar University of Cairo who was fully 
convinced and believed that the recommendations were not contrary 
to sharīʿah. In August 1962, The Pilgrims Saving Corporation was 
incorporated, and it was subsequently launched on the 30th of 
September, 1963. In 1969, the Corporation was merged with the 
Pilgrims Affairs Office, which had been in operation since 1951 in the 
state of Penang, Malaysia. This gave birth to the Lembaga Urusan dan 
Tabung Haji (Pilgrims Management and Fund Board) (Tabung Haji, 
1995). In 2011, Tabung Haji fund size was RM28 billion and it 
participated in short and long-term equity investment activities in 
different sectors including industrial, services, plantations and 
properties.  
In 1975, a group of businessmen took the initiative of 
establishing the first Islāmic bank, Dubai Islamic Bank in Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), with official support from the 
governments of the UAE and Kuwait that respectively contributed 20 
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percent and 10 percent of the capital. The most important development 
in the history of modern IBF is the establishment of the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) in 1975. It was established as an 
international financial institution in pursuance of the declaration of 
intent issued by the Conference of Finance Ministers of Islamic 
Countries held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in December 1973. The 
declaration was signed by the representatives of 23 OIC member 
countries. The Second Conference of Finance Ministers, held in 
Jeddah in August 1974, adopted the Articles of Agreement 
establishing the IDB, and the inaugural meeting of the Board of 
Governors of IDB took place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in July 1975 
and the bank started functioning on 20th of October 1975.  
The 1980s saw IBF maturing at a slower pace. However, 
during this period, more sharīʿah compliant financial instruments 
were developed and several multinational banks started offering IBF 
instruments; a recognition of the model viability and its acceptance by 
international players. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank also recognized Islāmic financial products as a genuine 
means of financial intermediation and produced studies to that effect 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1987). During the period, attention was also 
given to non-bank Islamic financial institutions such as takaful 
(insurance) companies and investment funds. Unlike the Islāmic 
insurance sector which did not register sufficient growth, Islāmic 
investment funds witnessed significant progress.  
The 1990s saw initiatives for the establishment of 
infrastructural institutions supporting the IBF industry. In the 
beginning, IBF institutions had to work within the mainstream 
financial institutional framework, hence leaving them at a 
disadvantageous position vis a vis the mainstream financial 
institutions (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The initiatives started in the 
1990 led to standardization and regulation that enhanced IBF growth 
in the 2000s. 
  
3.  IBF: IDEAL AND REALITY 
 
Prohibiting the receipt and payment of ribā’ has been seen as the 
central feature of IBF. However, the ideal philosophical foundation of 
IBF goes beyond the interaction of factors of production. The 
prohibition of ribā’ is only a means to achieve the end; the maqāṣid of 
sharīʿah, Islāmic religio-socio-economic objectives, which include 
the ability for the poor to participate in the global economic order. This 
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is visioned to be achieved through elimination of ribā’ by moving to 
profit and loss sharing (PLS) instruments and transactions. The IBF 
system places equal emphasis on ethical, moral, social, and religious 
dimensions, to enhance equality and fairness for the good of society 
as a whole (Rosly and Bakar, 2003; Ahmad, 1992; Chapra, 1985; 
Siddiqi, 1985; Al-Sadr, 1982).  
 IBF addresses the issue of financial inclusion from two 
directions; the promotion of risk-sharing contracts, and through 
Islāmic wealth distribution instruments. In the case of poverty 
alleviation, the use of risk-sharing financing instruments can be 
offered through sharīʿah-compliant microfinance, financing for small 
and medium enterprises, and micro-insurance. Islāmic redistributive 
instruments such as zakat and sadaqah complement the risk-sharing 
instruments in targeting the poor sector of society.  
 Ideally, IBF should be responsible for community social 
welfare; however, Ismail (2002) stressed that IBF is a commercial 
entity and it should not be treated as a social welfare institution. 
“Islāmic banks are … not charitable organizations, and that they must 
turn a profit” (Warde, 2000). IBF institutions’ main responsibility is 
to the shareholders and depositors; they should not be burdened with 
social welfare responsibilities which is the duty of the government. 
The use of shareholders’ funds for social activities not required by the 
law may jeopardize IBF viability and competitiveness. Ismail (2002) 
suggested that profit maximization as the primary aim does not negate 
the importance of societal responsibility. Social objectives can be 
attained indirectly by being continuously profitable, viable and 
sustainable, as suggested by free marketers. In fact, the majority of 
Islāmic banks’ stakeholders regard IBF institutions as entities with 
distinctive characteristics distinguishing them from their mainstream 
counterparts; they are equally perceived as organizations 
characterized by ethical norms and social commitments without 
undermining the commercial aspects of doing business (Dusuki and 
Dar, 2007).  
    
3.1  IBF INSTRUMENTS6 
 
El-Hawary et al. (2004) define the IBF system as a system that adheres 
to the following four principles: 
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a. Risk-sharing: the terms of financial transactions need to reflect 
a symmetrical risk/return distribution among each participant to 
the transaction. 
b. Materiality: all financial transaction must have “material 
finality,” i.e., be directly linked to a real underlying economic 
transaction; thus options and most other derivatives are banned. 
c. No exploitation: neither party to the transaction should be 
exploited. 
d. No financing of haram (sinful) activities: transaction cannot be 
used to produce goods banned by the Quran (e.g., alcohol, pork 
products, gambling). 
 
It is expected that IBF instruments are to depend on, and to grow 
in tandem with real economic activities. Financial transactions must 
be accompanied by underlying real activities, unlike the mainstream 
financial system, where it can be distinct from the real side of the 
economy. This is evidenced by the volume of financial transactions 
that dwarf real economic activity. For example, the value of world 
financial transactions, was 25 times world GDP in 1995, it rose to 70 
times that value by 2007 (Matheson, 2011). Ideally, IBF will shift the 
mainstream interest debt-based financial intermediation to an equity-
based and risk-sharing arrangement (Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007). 
However, both risk sharing and “debt-based” instruments are being 
offered by IBF.  
 
3.1.2  MAIN FORMS OF PROFIT AND LOSS SHARING (PLS) 
INSTRUMENTS IN ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
Main forms of PLS instruments in IBF are: 
a. Muḍārabah: ‘Trustee finance contract’ or passive partnership, 
where one party provides funds while the other provides the 
expertise. Profits accrued are shared on a pre-agreed basis but 
losses are borne only by capital provider. 
b. Mushārakah: ‘Equity participation contract’ providing for 
profit/loss sharing in joint business. The financier provides a 
portion of the total funds and all partners may participate in 
management. Profits are distributed in pre-agreed ratios but 
losses are borne strictly in proportion to respective capital 
contributions.  
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c. Ṣukūk: Islāmic bonds, generally paying a ‘LIBOR+X%’ rate but 
may have a fixed rate if backed by ijārah or murābaḥah 
transactions. It must be asset-backed and sharīʿah compliant. 
 
 
3.1.3  MAIN FORMS OF NON-PLS OR TRADE BASED  
ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
Main forms of non-PLS instruments in IBF are: 
a. Murābaḥah: Mark up sale, i.e., a sale on mutually agreed profit, 
where client requests the bank to purchase an item and bank 
resells the item to the client for a predetermined marked up price 
usually paid in instalments. 
b. Ijārah: Lease or lease-purchase agreement. 
c. Bai‘-Salam: deferred delivery purchase; only items that can be 
fully specified in terms of quantity, quality, attributes, etc., are 
eligible; monetary instruments are specifically excluded. 
d. Bai‘-Muajjal: Deferred payment/credit sale, where seller 
informs buyer of cost, selling price and the final payment date 
(may be instalment or lump sum); spot price may be lower than 
deferred payment price. 
e. Ji’ala: Service charge, consultancy fee, placement fee, etc. 
 
3.2  IDEAL VS REALITY 
 
The debate over the practice of IBF has led to the distinction between 
sharīʿah-compliant and sharīʿah-based Islāmic products (Ahmed, 
2011, 2014), where the latter are products that follow the maqāsid. 
Current practices of IBF are sharīʿah-compliant; however the majority 
are not sharīʿah-based. Only a negligible portion of IBF financing and 
products are following the ideal PLS mode (Dusuki and Abdullah, 
2007; Khan, 2010). In the case of Malaysia in 2004, only 0.5 percent 
of Islāmic bank financing was based on the PLS mode of muḍārabah 
and mushārakah (Chong and Liu, 2009), which is consistent with 
Islāmic banking experiences in other countries such as Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sudan (Mills and Presley, 
1999).  Yousef (2004) showed that the share of mark-up instrument in 
total financing in Middle East and North Africa was 85.6 percent, in 
East Asia it was 70.4 percent, in South Asia it was 92.2 percent, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa at 55.7 percent.  Khan (2010) showed that among 
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the biggest Islāmic banks, 78.4 percent of Kuwait Finance House 
financing was non-PLS, and it was 99.5 percent for Al-Rajhi. 
These figures indicate that instead of moving closer to the 
ideal, IBF institutions have tended to respond to prevailing forces of 
the global financial system by moving closer to mainstream financial 
institution practice. IBF may have expanded the Muslim financial 
base, but many institutions have been taken over by pragmatic bankers 
who shift the core operation away from the original ideals. IBF 
institutions avoid PLS contracts such as muḍārabah and mushārakah 
as the central instruments. Instead, they operate largely on debt-based 
contracts, such as murābaḥah, ijārah, salam, or istiṣnā‘. As such, the 
concept behind IBF has been reduced to the mere removal of interest.  
As suggested by Ismail (2002) however, the main responsibility of 
IBF institutions is to their shareholders; they should not be involved 
in too risky ventures hence jeopardizing bank sustainability and their 
stakeholder interests. If PLS contracts may be too risky a proposition 
for the IBF, and may not maximize its profit, why has IBF achieved 
this phenomenal growth? Will IBF achieve such growth by moving on 
the proper tangent? 
 
4.  THE GROWTH OF IBF 
 
The phenomenal growth of IBF can be broken up into two periods: the 
early stage of development in the 1970s and the period characterized 
by increased multipolarity of the Islāmic world in the late 1990s, 
where emerging nations such as Malaysia played a key role, in 
addition to vast transformations in international finance, driven by 
technological change, innovation, deregulation and globalization 
(Warde, 2005). The factors determining, and their importance for, the 
growth of IBF in these two periods differ because of the changes in 
the global socio-political-economic environments. The intersection 
between Islāmic resurgence and petrodollar has been argued as the 
main factor responsible for the momentum of IBF institutions; 
however, not exclusively as those who patronize IBF institutions 
include both Muslim and non-Muslim. The factors that have been 
proposed in explaining IBF growth include: 
a. Islāmic resurgence.  
b. Petro-dollar: the oil price surge in the 1970s and the late 1990s.  
c. September 11, 2001 incident. 
d. Standardization of IBF Industry Regulatory Framework. 
e. Government Support. 
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4.1  ISLAMIC RESURGENCE  
 
Islāmic resurgence since the 1960s has driven the IBF industry (Chong 
and Liu, 2009; Asutay, 2007; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). The 
resurgence is one of the most important social movements of the 20th 
century, affecting every Muslim country from North Africa to South-
east Asia. The surge in religious participation and values in Muslim 
societies lurks in the background of debate on the clash of 
civilizations, the so-called war on terror and the ‘failure’ of 
multiculturalism (Berger,1999). The resurgence intensifies 
discussions on the Islāmic economic system and ribā’ free economy 
as an alternative to the interest based economic system. The success 
of MitGhmar and Tabung Haji invigorated Muslim scholars, 
showcasing the viability of IBF. Academic circles rode on the success 
and promoted IBF in academic seminars and conferences, while 
politicians used the concept to awaken the public as well as for their 
personal political mileage. The 1970s also saw the fight for regional 
power between Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab 
socialist ideology and Saudi King Faisal’s pan-Islamism. Petro-dollars 
helped King Faisal to trump over pan-Arab socialist ideology, further 
fuelling Islāmic resurgence in the Arab world. However, Soliman 
(2005) argues that the MitGhamr Saving Bank is not an exclusively 
Islāmic institution.  
 
“Al-Najjar never made any reference to Islam in the process of 
founding the bank for fear the project will be rejected…[hence] 
we can conclude … neither the state nor the public was 
informed that the motive behind the creation of the bank was 
an Islāmic one” (Soliman, 2005).  
 
Notwithstanding whether MitGhamr is truly an Islāmic Bank, it had 
provided an impetus for the development of the IBF industry and 
helped invigorate the discussions on an alternative financial system.  
If Islāmic resurgence had helped in the early development of 
IBF institutions, they need to be viewed as “Islāmic” by their 
customers, and that the main reason for patronizing IBF institutions is 
religious observance. Critics of IBF pointed out that there is nothing 
Islāmic about current IBF practices. The financial instruments offered 
by the IBF institutions are technically sharīʿah compliant, yet, 
economically there are no differences between financial instruments 
used by mainstream banks and IBF institutions (El Gamal, 2006; 
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Nomani, 2006; Zaman, 2002). Khan (2010) shows that current IBF 
practices do not satisfy any of the four Islāmic banking principles as 
suggested by El-Hawary et al. (2004) and describe it as “weakly” 
Islāmic at best. Kuran (2004) called IBF fundamentalist, essentially 
political, and economically counterproductive.  Ahmad (1992) states 
that:7 
 
“The sad reality is that though everyone concedes that Islam 
prohibits interest, there is not a single Muslim country which 
running its financial institutions without resorting to interest. 
The fact is that no one knows how to do it, and when political 
pressure mounts, they can only resort to some kind of 
subterfuge.” (16) 
 
“The worst part of the story is that Islāmic economists, as a 
body in their International Monetary and Fiscal Conference 
held in Islamabad in 1981, gave their unreserved approval to 
this arrangement. So far this is the best that Islāmic economics 
has to offer, viz., change the name of interest and you have 
abolished interest.” (48) 
 
Sympathizers argued that IBF institutions are still in their infancy, 
there is a need to replicate mainstream instruments, instead of coming 
up with risky new untried products. Nevertheless, debt based products 
that mimic conventional instruments are the more popular products, 
instead of the “strongly Islāmic” PLS instruments. It should also be 
stressed that in certain cases the IBF institutions are required to mimic 
conventional products in order to be able to legally operate within the 
mainstream financial system (El Gamal, 2006).    
 Studies on factors motivating customers to patronize IBF 
institutions show that religious observance is one of the considerations 
but it is not the only factor. Thus, Islāmic resurgence may help to 
explain a part of the momentum in IBF. Erol and El-Bdour (1989, 
1990) show that factors such as fast and efficient service, bank 
reputation and image, and confidentiality are the primary criteria for 
the choice of Islāmic or mainstream bank,8 suggesting that religious 
motivation in bank selection is not the only reason. Naser et al. (1999) 
extend the early work by Erol and El-Bdour (1989) and conclude that 
bank reputation and the religious beliefs were the two most important 
factors motivating the use of Islāmic banking services. Omer (1992) 
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and Metwally (1996), however, conclude that religion was the primary 
factor in the choice of an Islāmic banking institution.9 
A number of similar studies were subsequently undertaken in a 
variety of contexts. In Bahrain, Metawa and Almossawi (1998) 
conclude that the most important factor in determining the attitudes of 
Islāmic bank customers was religion, then profitability. In Egypt, 
Hegazy (1995) compares the demographic profiles of four hundred 
customers of two banks and suggests the choice of Islāmic bank is 
based partly on religious motivation, but customers still rank bank 
service speed and efficiency near the top of their selection criteria. 
These studies suggest that besides religious observance the 
explanation for IBF growth needs to take into account factors such as 
the efficiency of IBF institutions and the rate of return on investment. 
Religiosity may entice Muslim customers to IBF institutions; 
efficiency and rate of return, however, are important in keeping them.   
  
4.2  PETRO-DOLLAR 
 
Islāmic resurgence helped to establish IBF institutions of the smaller 
scale such as MitGhmar, however it was the massive support from oil 
wealth and the political economy conditions of the time that helped to 
institute the Islāmic banking system with the help of IDB. In 1973, the 
average crude oil price was USD3.29 per barrel; it quadrupled to 
USD11.58 per barrel in 1974. The surge provided opportunity for 
King Faisal to extend his power using petro-dollar to trump Nasser’s 
pan-Arabism, and establish the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC) and Islamic Development Bank (IDB) that are instrumental in 
developing IBF (Castle, 2008; El Gamal, 2008; Warde, 2000). The 
importance of oil price in the IBF equation is further evidence by the 
slow momentum of IBF in the 1980s. IBF finance was thus often 
dismissed as a passing fad associated with the oil boom (Rivlin, 2008). 
 In the second growth period the use of petro-dollar to 
encourage IBF growth is markedly different. High oil price created a 
pool of financial liquidity among oil exporters in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states, similar to surpluses during the 1970s and early 
1980s. However, in the 1970s, the GCC were unprepared for their 
sudden surpluses; generally, they outsourced the management of the 
surpluses to commercial, usually American bankers, and much of the 
surpluses were invested in U.S. T-bills or Eurodollar deposits in the 
West. The GCC states were not seeking to alter the global financial 
system; they simply followed the prevailing wealth management 
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practices. Consequently, the U.S. remained the central player in the 
international financial system. During the second growth period, as 
IBF institutions strengthened, in addition to the September 11 
incident, GCC members were more strategic about their petro-dollar 
investment. They adopt ambitious investment strategies and spent on 
institutional infrastructure locally, creating free-trade zones for 
manufacturing, developing services and facilities that would attract 
businesses, skilled knowledge workers, and tourists (Abdelal, Khan, 
and Khanna, 2008). The changes in investment strategy fuelled the 
growth of IBF in the second period as the surpluses from oil wealth 
were spent locally or invested in IBF institution in Muslim countries 
(Imam and Kpodar, 2016; Kpodarand Imam, 2010). 
 
4.3  SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 INCIDENT 
 
The Sept 11, 2001 incident affected Islāmic finance both positively 
and negatively. Many credible financial institutions of Muslim 
countries were accused of racketeering, wrongful death, negligence 
and conspiracy in a lawsuit dismissed later. But it inflicted damage to 
the reputation and operation of these institutions. American officials, 
ignorant about Islāmic finance, viewed all Islāmic banks with 
heightened suspicion (Islahi, 2006) and froze assets of prominent 
Saudis, harassing IBF institutions and Islāmic charities (Malik et al, 
2011). The negative perception forced Muslims investors to seek more 
hospitable locations to deposit and invest their money. In the 
atmosphere of growing mistrust between the West and the Muslim 
world, IBF have been mobilized politically to promote a regional 
market for capital mobilization and investment nurtured by Islāmic 
solidarity (Smith, 2004).  
 In the beginning, because of diverging interpretation of the 
sharīʿah,10 Muslim countries did not strategically coordinate IBF 
implementation. Sensing “that Islam was a religion under siege” 
(Warde, 2005), induced the rise in religiosity in Muslim countries and 
suspended earlier misgivings over diverging interpretations of 
sharīʿah in IBF and gave way to a quest for common ground. This 
eased the effort of standardizing the regulatory framework in the 
industry by IDB, AAOIFI and IFSB, which helped to enhance trust in 
the industry. 
As for IBF, Malaysia which has a relatively sophisticated 
financial system, sensed opportunity from the surplus wealth from the 
Muslim oil exporting countries, and used clever marketing to 
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attractthese investors into IBF. Malaysia issued the first sovereign 
sukūk in 2002, and made a point of appointing sharīʿah scholars from 
the GCC states to monitor compliance. It should be noted that Arab-
Malaysian integration is part of the broader phenomenon of IBF 
regionalization. 
   
4.4  STANDARDIZATION OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
Studies show that among the reasons a consumer will patronize an IBF 
institution are the bank’s good reputation and image, which require 
standardized regulatory framework in the industry. Investors will 
invest only if they trust the consistency and stability of the institution. 
The newly standardized regulations prompted by reaction to the 
September 11, 2001 incident help to better monitor IBF operations, 
thus providing the needed confidence and encouraging fund 
movement especially after the incident. 
With the help of IDB, IBF institutions stepped up their efforts 
in standardizing Islāmic banking industry regulation and supervision. 
IDB played the key role in developing internationally acceptable 
standards and procedures, strengthening the IBF industry architecture 
in different countries. Several other international institutions are also 
working to set sharīʿah-compliant standards and harmonize them 
across countries. These include the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the Islamic 
Finance Service Board (IFSB), the International Islamic Financial 
Market, the Liquidity Management Center, and the International 
Islamic Rating Agency (Solé, 2007; Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). 
Indeed, a number of countries and institutions have adopted the 
accounting standards developed by the AAOIFI, which complement 
IFSB.  
 
4.4.1  ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK 
 
IDB is a multilateral development bank serving Muslim countries, 
with 55 member countries. Its purpose is to foster economic 
development and the social progress of member countries and Muslim 
communities in accordance with sharīʿah principles.IDB has 
established a number of institutions and funds with distinct 
administrative arrangements and operational rules, which enable IDB 
to mobilize supplementary financial resources in line with 
 Towards a More Socially Inclusive and Sustainable Framework…… 375 
 
 
sharīʿahprinciples and to focus on those functions and activities which 
cannot be covered under its normal financing arrangements. 
In order to promote IBF growth, IDB supports the 
establishment of Islamic financial institutions licensed in various 
jurisdictions by participating in their equity capital, and helps to 
introduce Islāmic windows in mainstream banks. IDB does not 
support its financial resources by borrowing funds from mainstream 
financial markets as this involves payment of interest. For this reason, 
the Bank developed sharīʿah-compliant financial schemes and 
instruments to support its ordinary financial resources.  
 
4.4.2  THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR 
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (AAOIFI) 
 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) is an Islāmic international autonomous non-
profit making corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing, 
governance, ethics and sharīʿah standards for Islamic financial 
institutions. It was established in accordance with the Agreement of 
Association which was signed by Islamic financial institutions on 26 
February 1990 in Algiers. It was registered in the Kingdom of Bahrain 
on 27 March 1991. The AAOIFI standards were introduced for the 
first time in 1993 for Islamic financial institutions.  
 
4.4.3  THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD (IFSB) 
 
Proper regulation and supervision of banks and financial institutions 
is important for financial efficiency and stability. Some of the risks 
faced by the IBF industry are unique due to the sharīʿah compliance 
requirements. Bank supervisors utilizing the traditional standards 
cannot assess such risks. The need for special guidelines for regulating 
and supervising Islāmic banks has long been felt. Some regulatory 
authorities have already introduced guidelines for Islāmic banking 
supervision in their respective jurisdictions. With the active 
involvement of the IMF, the IDB and support from the Bahrain 
Monetary Agency, Bank Negara Malaysia and other central banks, 
IFSB was established in Malaysia in November 2002 and has been in 
operation since March 2003. The IFSB aims at promoting 
development of a prudent and transparent Islāmic financial services 
industry and provides guidance on the effective supervision and 
regulation of institutions offering Islāmic financial products. IFSB 
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published exposure drafts of capital adequacy and risk management 
standards for Islamic financial institutions. This helped regulators both 
in countries that already have well-developed Islāmic financial 
systems and in Western countries to understand and supervise Islāmic 
finance. Its mandate is to serve as an international standard-setting 
body for the regulatory and supervisory agencies interested in 
ensuring the soundness and stability of the Islāmic financial services 
industry. It also strives to develop standards in accordance with the 
unique features of Islamic financial institutions in coordination with 
the existing standard setting bodies. IFSB has begun developing two 
prudential standards for the Islāmic financial services industry: The 
Capital Adequacy and Risk Management standards.  
 
4.5  EFFICIENCY OF IBF 
 
Inefficiencies have been found to account for about 20 percent or more 
of costs in the banking industry (Berger et al., 1993), thus, it is 
expected that industry growing rapidly is more efficient than those 
growing at a slower pace. However, comparative studies on bank 
efficiency showed that Islāmic banks efficiency are at best similar to 
those of non-Islāmic banks.  
 Srairi (2010) shows conventional banks are more efficient 
than Islāmic banks for 71 banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries over the period 1999 – 2007 in terms of both cost and profit 
efficiency. In the case of Pakistan, Sarker (1999) concludes Islāmic 
banks could not achieve maximum efficiency under the mainstream 
banking framework. Samad and Hassan (2006) and Batchelor and 
Wadud (2003) show that Islāmic banks in Malaysia are less efficient 
than conventional banks, where full-fledged Islāmic banks tend to 
have lower technical efficiency than commercial banks offering 
Islāmic banking products because of decreasing return to scale. Rosly, 
Ibrahim, and Abdullah (2003) conducted a study on Islāmic banks in 
Sudan and found that the Islāmic banks have low efficiency – both 
technical and allocative: they were not optimizing their input usage. 
 In comparing the performance of 15 conventional and 15 
interest-free banks worldwide, Metwally (1997) concludes Islāmic 
banks faced more difficulties in attracting depositors compared to 
conventional banks, and that interest-free banks tend to be more 
traditional in utilizing funds, therefore they face many disadvantages 
in terms of investment opportunities. However, profitability and 
efficiency are similar for mainstream and Islāmic banks. Ismail, Abd 
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Majid, and Ab Rahim (2013) measured the cost efficiency of 34 
commercial banks in Malaysia for the period 1993-2000 tocompare 
relative performance of Islāmic and conventional banks. They argue 
that Islāmic bank efficiency is not statistically different from that of 
conventional banks. Samad (1999) was among the first to investigate 
the Malaysian Islāmic banking sector efficiency. His paper 
investigates the relative performance of the full-fledged Malaysian 
Islāmic bank compared to its conventional bank peers for the period 
1992 to 1996 and found that conventional bank managerial efficiency 
was higher than that of the full-fledged Islāmic bank. On the other 
hand, the measures of productive efficiency revealed mixed results. 
He suggested that the average utilization rate of the Islāmic banks is 
lower than that of the conventional banks. Similarly, he found that 
profits earned by the full-fledged Islāmic banks either through use of 
deposit or loanable funds, or used funds are also lower than that of the 
conventional banks, reflecting the weaker efficiency of the full-
fledged Islāmic banks. In contrast, the productivity test by loan 
recovery criterion indicate that the efficiency of the full-fledged 
Islāmic banks seems to be higher and bad debts as a percentage of 
equity, loans, and deposits also show a clear superiority over the 
conventional bank peers. 
These results suggest that bank efficiency does not play an 
important role in the growth of IBF as Islāmic bank efficiency is not 
better than for mainstream banks; instead some of them have lower 
efficiency than mainstream banks.  
 
4.6  GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
 
The importance of government support is manifested in Pakistan, Iran 
and Sudan, where the entire financial system was “Islamized”. On the 
other hand, some countries such as Malaysia are taking a gradual 
approach; yet within Malaysia, Kelantan state which is governed by 
the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) insistence on Islāmic pawn 
broking and the transferring of the state account from interest-based 
to Islamic bank in 1990s had affected the IBF industry there (Salleh, 
1999).  
 State intervention is also manifested in the history of IBF in 
the U.K. Lord Eddie George during his tenure as the Governor of the 
Bank of England played a key role in laying the foundations for 
Islamic mortgages in the U.K. The senior backing he provided led to 
the success of the Islāmic mortgage initiative.  Ahli United Bank11, has 
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been offering Islāmic mortgages in the UK since the late 1990s; it was 
the Finance Act 2003 supported by the Governor of the Bank of 
England that opened the door to sharīʿah-compliant mortgages 
providing impetus in this niche of financial markets by levelling the 
playing field for Islāmic mortgages regarding stamp duty. As a result, 
other players such as HSBC Amanah, Alburaq, Islamic Bank of 
Britain and Lloyds TSB entered the arena providing competition and 
increasing customer awareness. The efforts were not solely of 
importance to the UK, as press coverage for the initiative spread across 
the Muslim world. Many countries that were lagging behind or did not 
have the regulatory framework for IBF took the initiative to reframe 
their IBF structure. The Finance Act 2003 work assists changes 
elsewhere, influencing regulations in Malaysia and Brunei, among 
other countries.  
 In Egypt, the story of Islāmic finance cannot be separated 
from government policies: in the early seventies, the government 
promoted Islāmic banks as a component of infitah (‘open-door’) 
policies and as a counterweight to left-wing and Nasserite opposition. 
In recent years, just as the government’s policy against Islāmic groups 
has toughened, the economic – and rhetorical – war between 
conventional and Islāmic institutions has heated up, each side accusing 
the other of being un-Islāmic. 
 Bank Negara Malaysia establishment of centers for higher 
learning in Islāmic finance, and grouping of experts at institutes such 
as INCEIF, have helped to train Islāmic bankers conversant in both 
conventional and Islāmic finance, and trained in the sharīʿah.  
 
5.  CAN IBF INCLUDE THE EXCLUDED MUSLIMS? 
 
The rapid growth of IBF fuelled by Islāmic resurgence, petro-dollars 
and the 9/11 incident has not permeated the lives of many poorer 
Muslims disenfranchised by the economic system; thus, IBF 
institutions have not been successful in fulfilling the maqāṣid of 
sharīʿah. This begs the question of whether there is a need to 
restructure the IBF industry in alignment with the maqāṣid of 
sharīʿah, and if so, what steps and instruments are needed to include 
the excluded poor Muslim into the global financial system? 
 Asutay (2007) suggests current structure conforming to the 
legalistic Islāmic dimensions should remain, and should be accepted 
as the second-best solution; where the best is the theoretical position 
of Islāmic economics which stress the need to satisfy maqāṣid of 
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sharīʿah as suggested by Chapra (1985) among others. Even though 
limitationsexist in current IBF structures, IBF has offered important 
services. The maqāṣid can be served and structured in a newly 
introduced specialized Islāmic institution that incorporates the 
maqāṣid directly into its operation. Such a project can be through the 
introduction of sharīʿah-compliant instruments in mainstream 
microfinance institutions (MFI) hence the need for Islāmic 
microfinance institutions (iMFI). Even if PLS contracts may not be the 
preferred option, iMFI will target “non-bankable” Muslims, hence 
assisting in satisfying the goal of a fair and just economic system. A 
sizeable substratum, the poorest of the poor, are not “bankable”, and 
desperately need assistance. iMFI will have the poorest of the poor as 
the primary criterion of eligibility for funding, as some of their capital 
funding are from zakāt12. 
 Meanwhile, Jouti (2019) proposed an integrated approach for 
building sustainable Islāmic social finance ecosystems. The approach 
includes the participation of traditional Islāmic institutions of zakāt, 
sadaqah and awqāf and commercial financing institutions. Islāmic 
capital markets can also help through socially responsible investments 
and to raise funds for social welfare projects through sharīʿah-
compliant financing instruments such as sukūk. Islāmic banks can also 
provide appropriate sharīʿah-compliant instruments to social welfare 
initiators. Technologically, sadaqah in the form of crowd funding may 
also assist in achieving inclusiveness. 
 
5.1  INCLUSION THROUGH ISLAMIC INSTRUMENTS OF  
WEALTH DISTRIBUTION 
 
Access to capital is one of the issues in MFI. The capital can be 
sourced from the institution’s own fund, from debt or from retail 
deposit; it can be sourced domestically or internationally.13 As some 
of the sources such as interest based debt are disallowed by sharīʿah, 
iMFI are suggested to use Islāmic redistributive instruments such as 
zakāt, sadaqah and awqāf as their funding sources (Habib, 2002). 
Following the experience of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development in issuing microfinance bonds socially responsible 
investment (SRI) sukūk has been suggested as a financing mechanism 
for Islāmic microfinance (Khouildi and Kassim, 2018; Zain and Sori, 
2017). Sukūk are certificates of equal value representing undivided 
ownership of assets, usufructs and services or the assets of particular 
projects or special investment activity. In 2019, BMT Bina Ummah, a 
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Yogyakarta-based Islāmic microfinance cooperative, raised IDR710 
million through a primary sukūk issuance on blockchain using 
Blossom Finance’s Smart Sukuk platform. The issuance is the world’s 
first primary sukūk issuance on public blockchain, as well as the first 
micro sukūk14. Funds raised from the issuance, which is structured 
under muḍārabah, are used to expand financing for local 
entrepreneurs.  
 Zakāt is an annual levy, obligatory on every Muslim who has 
reached the nisab (minimum wealth). It is strictly and explicitly 
earmarked in the Qur’an primarily for the poor and destitute, and 
secondarily for specific public needs. Sharīʿah is clear and elaborate 
in defining the nature of zakāt recipients and payers. While recipients 
of zakat funds are explicit, a greater degree of flexibility exists with 
respect to beneficiaries of sadaqah or voluntary charity. Awqāf is an 
endowment or a trust usually for charitable purpose. Awqāf have 
flourished in Muslim communities throughout history and provided 
important social services especially in the form of mosques, schools, 
hospitals, potable water sources, and support for the poor. Kahf (1998) 
defines wqāf as “diverting funds and other resources from 
consumption and investing them in productive assets that provide 
either usufruct or revenues for future consumption by individuals or 
groups of individuals.” 
 Indeed, some iMFI, such as Baitul Mal Wat Tamwil (BMT) in 
Indonesia are using these Islāmic sources of funds and wealth 
distribution instruments.15 BMT is a unique iMFI established by 
individual or group initiatives to help micro-entrepreneurs and 
eradicate rural poverty especially in villages or traditional markets by 
operating informally with minimum regulation and supervision 
(NurKholis, 2008). It is not a bank but operates like a bank. Some 
BMTs are registered with the Ministry of Cooperation and Small 
Enterprise as sharīʿah saving and loan cooperatives and some as the 
business units of Islāmic charity organizations (Wahyuni, 2008). BMT 
has dual functions– as a BaitulMaal and a BaitulTamwil. BaitulMaal 
collect and distribute zakāt, sadaqah, awqāf, and so forth, while 
BaitulTamwil function as financial intermediaries providing financial 
services to micro enterprises through the ‘allowable’ BaitulMaal fund, 
as some of the funds collected are earmarked for specific groups of 
recipients clearly defined in the sharīʿah (Hadisumarto and Ismail, 
2010). BaitulTamwil financing can be in terms of PLS, mark-up or 
qarḍul-ḥasan.  
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 The main issue with zakat and sadaqah-dependent institutions 
is sustainability of funds as they are rooted in voluntarism. Funds 
mobilized through charity are inconsistent and may not lend 
themselves to careful planning and implementation. Fund 
sustainability can be sustained through a self-generating funding 
mechanism. BaitulTamwil helps the BaitulMaal regenerate funds 
through the financing provided to the poor. One of the unique 
instruments from BMT and other iMFI is qarḍul-ḥasan16, which is a 
loan entered into by the lender without expectation of any return on 
the principal. While the debtor is obliged to return the principal, the 
lender is urged, according to a number of the sayings of the Prophet 
(ṣal-Allāhuʿalayhiwasallam) not to press the debtor if he or she is 
unable to repay by the specified deadline. The importance of qarḍul-
ḥasan is evidence as it is reported from the Prophet (ṣal-
Allāhuʿalayhiwasallam) that the reward by Allah (ʿazzawajalla) for 
sadaqah is ten times and that of qarḍul-ḥasan is 18 times. Unlike in 
zakat and sadaqah there is an effort to recover the loan, hence it is 
more sustainable; furthermore it is also an incentive for the debtor to 
use the loan productively.  
 In the case of Iran, qarḍul-ḥasanh as enjoyed phenomenal 
growth since the Iranian Revolution, where qardul-hasan funds 
usually provide small consumer and producer loans and, in some 
cases, lenders engage in profit-sharing activities with small producers. 
These funds are usually associated with a masjid or other religious 
organization and sometimes with guilds or professional associations. 
These funds operate with reasonably low administrative costs since 
most are managed by voluntary fund managers (Mirakhor and Iqbal, 
2007). Widiyanto, Mutamimah, and Hendar (2011) and Khan and 
Philips (2010) have shown how qardul-hasan financing through iMFI 
has been able to empower communities and help alleviate poverty in 
Central Java, Indonesia, Pakistan and Kosovo respectively. The 
largest microfinance scheme in Malaysia, Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia 
(AIM), also claims that its loans are based on qardul-hasan principles; 
however, AIM imposes a 10 percent service charge on its loans. 
 Sustainability is also addressed in awqāf through creation of 
permanent and income-generating physical assets. Awqāf has 
historically been the major vehicle for creating community assets. On 
the other hand, restrictions on wqāf asset development and use for pre-
specified purposes introduce rigidity into the system. Undoubtedly, it 
is important to preserve and develop assets under wqāf to add to 
productive capacity and create capabilities for wealth creation. Awqāf 
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may also be created specifically to impart knowledge and skills in 
entrepreneurship development among the poor as microfinance alone 
cannot create wealth unless combined with entrepreneurial skills. 
Indeed, all technical assistance programs can be organized as awqāf. 
Recently, monetary wqāf instead of physical asset has been suggested 
to circumvent the rigidity of use. Zarka (2013) argues that monetary 
wqāf has been permitted by some early jurists; however it was usually 
deemed an exception with limited applicability because of 
misappropriation risk. IBF with the current regulations and standards 
can ease the monitoring process, hence making monetary wqāf 
feasible and more desirable. The monetary wqāf could be another 
source for iMFI funding. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Many Muslims are marginalized from the global economy because the 
mainstream interest based financial system is in conflict with the 
sharīʿah (Islamic law). To address the issue, IBF has developed 
sharīʿah compliant instruments. The ultimate objective of IBF is to 
promote Islāmic norms of economic behavior, and ultimately to 
realize the maqāṣidal-sharīʿah in creating a just economic system by 
eliminating ribā’. The PLS instruments employed by IBF institutions, 
such as mudārabah, are considered the ideal mode of Islāmic finance. 
In contrast to conventional interest-based finance, PLS instruments 
counter unequal income and wealth distributions, leading to optimal 
resource allocation. PLS instruments ensure justice in the relationships 
between the parties involved, as returns to the bank depend 
entrepreneur operational results. 
 IBF institutional growth has been phenomenal since its 
introduction in the 1960s. The expansion has been especially 
pronounced in the 1970s and since the late 1990s. The upsurge of IBF 
in the 1970s was driven by oil price rises, competition for regional 
power between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and a general Islāmic 
resurgence. The second upsurge involved similar drivers, but with the 
added benefit of standardized regulation and management, as well as 
improved overall business decision-making. The aftermath of 11 
September 2001 reinforced the second surge in Islāmic finance. The 
sense that Islam was under siege strengthened the quest for common 
ground in IBF institutions. Divergent interpretations of the sharīʿah 
had previously divided the industry. After 2001 initiatives to enhance 
standardization were led by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 
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Jeddah, the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) in Manama, and the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) in Kuala Lumpur. 
 Today, the Islāmic banking industry has become systemically 
important in many countries; Islāmic assets have reached USD2.19 
trillion, up from just USD150 billion in the 1990s. The sector includes 
many specifically Islāmic institutions, such as Al Rajhi Bank Saudi 
Arabia, Bank Islam Malaysia and Bank Melli Iran. In addition, many 
large global financial institutions such as Citibank and HSBC have 
added Islāmic banking alongside their conventional operations. It is 
now also possible to hold Islāmic accounts with these banks in 
Western countries, where some non-Muslims have become customers 
as well. 
 The early IBF institutions of the 1960s, such as MitGhamr 
Savings Bank in Egypt and TabungHaji in Malaysia, were socially 
oriented institutions, anchored in the maqāṣidal-sharīʿah and Islāmic 
economic vision. They provided credits and other financial services to 
peasants, small businesses, and workers, aiming at overcoming 
financial exclusion and expanding the ownership base of society. 
However, subsequently, IBF institutions have tended to respond to 
prevailing international financial system forces by moving closer to 
conventional financial institution operations. IBF continues to expand 
the Muslim financial base and reduce financial exclusion, but many 
institutions have been taken over by pragmatic bankers who shift the 
core operation away from the original religious and social ideals. 
Today, most IBF institutions avoid PLS as a central instrument. The 
use of more risky PLS contracts, such as mudārabah and mushārakah, 
has dramatically declined. Instead, IBF institutions operate largely on 
debt-based contracts, such as murābaḥah, ijarah, salam, or istisnā. 
These relatively safe credits are similar, in some respects, to lending 
on the basis of fixed interest. 
 The new generation of financial instruments are at odds with 
the foundational axioms of Islāmic economics. As such, the concept 
behind IBF has been reduced to the mere removal of ribā’ and the 
conduct of financial activities according to sharīʿahderived 
contractual norms. IBF institutions are following the letter of the 
sharīʿah, but not its spirit, the maqāṣid. The marked-up contracts are 
only weakly Islāmic.  
 The simplistic ‘pragmatism’ has meant that globalization and 
unprecedented growth of IBF has not permeated the lives of many 
poorer Muslims disenfranchised by the current economic system. 
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These low-income groups are not interested in sukūk, capital protected 
funds, Islāmic hedge funds, AAOIFI standards or IFSB prudential 
regulations. They want access to Islāmic micro-credits, SME 
financing, venture capital and other related programs. ‘Non-bankable’ 
Muslims want the dignity to provide for their families financially, and 
IBF could do much more to this end. iMFI has been suggested as the 
driver for inclusiveness because of the ‘failure’ of IBF, and these iMFI 
have been using Islāmic wealth distribution instruments as their source 
of capital. Recent developments also saw sharīʿah-compliant 
financing instruments such as sukūk being developed to improve 
inclusiveness. However, unlike MFI, formal iMFI are very recent, 
similar to the IBF industry. They will need time to adjust to the fast 
moving global financial system before including the marginalized 
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1. Shariah or Islāmic law is meant to regulate all aspects of a Muslim's 
way of life. It is broadly divided into two sets of rules: one relates to 
the obligatory worship of God (ʿibādah) and the other relates to daily 
life outside the context of obligatory worship (muamalat), including 
commercial and financial dealings. 
2. “The ‘ulama’ classified masalih-cum-maqāṣid into three categories in 
a descending order of importance, beginning with the essential 
masalih, or daruriyyat, followed by the complementary benefits, or 
hajiyyat, and then the embellishments or tahsiniyyat. … The essential 
interests are enumerated at five, namely faith, life, lineage, intellect 
and property. … The second class of the interests, known as hajiyyat, 
or complementary interests are defined as benefits which seek to 
remove severity and hardship that do not pose a threat to the very 
survival of normal order. … The third class of masalih, known as 
tahsiniyyat, are in the nature of desirables as they seek to attain 
refinement and perfection in the customs and conduct of people at all 
levels of achievement” (Kamali, 1999). 
3. IFSB’s Financial Stability Report 2016, specified that an Islāmic 
banking system is classified as systemically important if it accounts 
for 15 percent or more of the domestic banking system assets. 
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4. Most of the Muslim majority countries are less developed, hence 
access to financial intermediaries, both mainstream and Islāmic are 
still lacking. 
5. The IDB prize in Islāmic banking for the year 1410 Hijri (1990A.D) 
was awarded to Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (Pilgrimage 
Management and Fund Board) of Malaysia, considering the 
significance of Tabung Haji as an Islamic Financial Institution which 
has mobilized savings of individuals and successfully operated an 
investment fund in an Islāmic way in order to fulfil the lifelong desire 
of many individuals for the performance of the haj rituals. Tabung 
Haji has devised an innovative way to motivate Muslims to save in 
order to provide for their expenses for performing the pilgrimage. It 
has managed the resources mobilized from small savers in an efficient 
manner and invested them in industry, commerce, agriculture and real 
estate in conformity with Islāmic principles. In this way, it has not 
only provided Islāmic services to the individuals but has, at the same 
time, operated a huge investment fund using investment techniques 
conforming to sharīʿah (Tabung Haji, 1995).  
6. Based on Khan (2010) Box 1, p. 809. 
7. Quoted from El Gamal (2006). 
8. The study surveyed Jordan customers. 
9. Omer (1992) surveyed three hundred Muslims in the United Kingdom 
on their patronage factors and awareness of Islāmic financing 
methods. Metwally (1996) also used factor analysis to study the 
attitudes of Muslims in three Arabic dual-banking systems (Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt) towards Islāmic banking.  
10. While sharīʿah is immutable and infallible, fiqh is 
changeable. Fiqh deals with the observance of rituals, morals and 
social legislation in Islam as well as political systems. There are four 
prominent schools of fiqh within Sunni.  
11. Formerly known as United Bank of Kuwait. 
12. Obaidullah, M. p. 10. 
13. International sources of funding may come from the United Nations 
(UN) agencies, development finance institutions and private 
institutions or individual investors. Hsu (2007) shows that domestic 
sources of funding, including deposits account for 85 percent of MFI 




15. There are three levels of Islāmic banks in Indonesia, based on size: (i) 
General commercial banks, (ii) Rural banks and (ii) Sub-rural 
financial institutions. Bank Muamalat Indonesia represents the first 
kind. PT Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syariah (PT BPRS) represents the 
second form. Rural banks must be located in the capital of Kecamatan 
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and prohibited to operate beyond the approved areas. The third form 
is BMT.The establishment of BMT is triggered by the limited 
opportunity to establish a formal Islāmic bank either in the form of 
General Bank, or Rural Bank.  
16. Qarḍ is a noun signifying the act of tearing something apart with one’s 
teeth, suggesting perhaps the act of tearing away a part of one’s wealth 
in the form of a loan (suggesting a painful process). Hasan means 
splendid or beautiful. The two words together mean a ‘beautiful loan’ 
perhaps because, as the Qurʾān asserts, these loans are made to Allah 
(ʿazza wajalla)rather than to the borrower and this eases the pain of 
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